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This paper looks at the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), where economies have been most dramatically 
hit by the global crisis and its impact is likely to be most long-lasting, especially among poor 
and vulnerable groups. Using poverty as the main axis, it looks at aspects of economic and 
social development in countries at similar poverty levels to identify the degree of fiscal space 
in each, as well as the different policy choices made. The paper argues that despite such 
economic fundamentals as increasing external debt, worsening current account imbalances, 
and demands for a balanced budget, governments have policy choices to make about how to 
protect different groups, especially the most vulnerable—including women. 
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Over the last three decades, through a series of UN meetings and their follow-up review 
conferences (including the 4th World Conference on Women in 1995, the Financing for 
Development Conference in 2002, and, most recently, the High Level Conference on the 
Global Financial and Economic Conference and its Impact on Development), governments, 
national and international organizations, and women’s rights advocates have placed gender 
equality squarely on the human development agenda. They have committed to take actions 
to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in areas such as education, 
healthcare, and employment opportunities, as well as in critical areas of well-being such as 
infant and maternal mortality. Through engaging in these processes, women’s rights and 
gender-equality advocates have become increasingly aware of the need to investigate 
national and global macroeconomic policies with respect to gender-related outcomes.  
Integrating gender equality into macroeconomic policy priorities is critical not only 
to ensure that women equally realize the right to food, health, education, and decent work, 
but also because, as the World Bank (2006a) has shown, eliminating the gender gap in 
socioeconomic opportunities means improved well-being for families and communities, as 
well as better performing economies. 
The importance of engaging in macroeconomic policy debate has become especially 
clear since the onset of the world financial and economic crisis in 2008. What began as a 
monetary and financial crisis rapidly became a global human development and human rights 
crisis, seriously impeding progress towards national development goals and creating 
enormous health and welfare challenges (OHCHR 2009; WHO 2009; UN 2009a; AI 2009). 
As forecasted by a European Commission report job markets and public finances are weak 
and likely to stay weak and vulnerable to external and internal shocks despite economic 
growth in 2009 (EC 2009a). This assessment was confirmed by a World Bank report in 
October 2009, which stated that the “pace of recovery is expected to be slow and, for quite 
some time, insufficient to decrease unemployment,” adding that poverty could increase 
significantly in a number of developing economies where real GDP per capita is contracting 
in 2009 “for the first time in a decade” (WB 2009a: 115). Thus, it is likely that the social 
impact of the crisis will continue to be felt for many years to come. 
The global economic downturn has seriously impacted the economies of many 
countries and devastated the lives of millions of people, not just women. However, some 
countries and groups have been affected more than others. This paper looks at the countries 
of central and eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),   
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where economies have been most dramatically hit by the global crisis and where its impact is 
likely to be most long-lasting, especially on poor and vulnerable groups. Using poverty as 
the main axis, it looks at aspects of economic and social development in countries at similar 
poverty levels to identify the degree of fiscal space in each, as well as the different policy 
choices made. It argues that despite such economic fundamentals as increasing external debt, 
worsening current account imbalances, and demands for balanced budgets, governments 
have policy choices to make about how to protect different groups, especially the most 
vulnerable. 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CEE AND CIS 
 
Table 1 presents selected economic indicators for ten regions, including the CEE and CIS. It 
shows that the contraction of GDP for countries in CIS in 2009 is estimated to be -6.7 
percent on average, the highest in the world, while that in the CEE is estimated to be -5, the 
third highest after Japan.
1 Furthermore, in the CEE region, net financial inflows are expected 
to decrease from USD 154.7 billion in 2008 to only USD 6.4 billion in 2009. The outlook is 
not much better for the CIS region; the reversal of net financial inflows, which has reached 
USD -97.4 billion, is projected to continue in 2009 with USD -98.5 billion.  
The World Bank (2009) estimates that in 2009, almost 40 percent of the 480 million 
people living in the CEE/CIS region remained poor or vulnerable; this number is expected to 
rise throughout the region by about 5 million people for every 1 percent decline in GDP. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO 2009a) estimates that as many as 58 million people 
may lose their jobs in 2009, a number that may increase by an additional 10 million by the 
end of 2010. Already unemployment has increased by 60 percent in Turkey, 50 percent in 
Baltic countries, and about 30 percent elsewhere.
2 CIS and non-EU countries in southeastern 
Europe have experienced massive layoffs in both the public and private sector; between 
March 2008 and March 2009, for example, youth unemployment increased more than 
threefold in Estonia and twofold in Lithuania (World Bank 2009). 
Most countries in the region experienced a sharp economic decline in 2009—
including Armenia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and particularly 
the high-growth Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which are now experiencing 
                                                            
1 This study utilizes World Bank, IMF, and UN data, as well as national statistics, therefore, it should be 




double-digit contractions (see table 3). The IMF (2009) estimates that between October 2008 
and April 2009, central and eastern European exports were down 35 percent. Output in this 
region is projected to fall by 5 percent in 2009 and to recover only modestly in 2010, 
growing by 1.6 percent. In 2009, growth was expected to decline by close to 5 percent in the 
European area, and countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states are likely to 
experience particularly sharp recessions (Velculescu 2009). The significant slowdown in 
economic growth, coupled with the near-exhaustion of major privatization opportunities in 
southern European countries, has already led to significant reductions in foreign investment 
flows to the region (see table 1). 
One of the reasons why the global economic crisis has had such a dramatic effect on 
economic output in countries in the CEE/CIS region is because of their dependence on 
international trade, foreign direct investment (FDIs), and remittances. However, even if 
world trade recovers, the decline in terms of trade for the region will make the recovery very 
sluggish, particularly for CIS countries, where the expected change in terms of trade in 2009 
is -20.5, the highest in the world.  
Another reason why the impact of the crisis was so great in the CEE/CIS region is 
that it came at a time when the region had just begun to recover from the shocks of the 
transition reforms (dubbed “shock therapy”) and the subsequent financial crisis of 1998. The 
national economic systems and the regional economic, financial, and banking systems were 
still quite fragile and remained dependent on Western support and markets, as well as access 
to Western capital and know-how. CEE countries especially had become highly integrated 
into the global economy and the global financial structures, leaving them uniquely 
vulnerable to the breakdown of the financial and banking system. 
IMF estimates show that real GDP will increase for most countries in 2010, while for 
the CEE/CIS region this is not likely to happen until 2014 (IMF 2009). Even where GDP 
does get back to precrisis levels, employment is likely to be stagnant for a long time to 
come—some jobs will never come back.  
As economic analysts frequently point out, jobs do not bounce back as fast as other 
macroeconomic indicators. Thailand and the Philippines for example, took a decade to reach 
their precrisis unemployment levels (Buvinic 2009). To put it more starkly, in the absence of 
public education, a child who is of school age this year will be 17 and illiterate by the time 
her parents could afford to send her to school in 2019. Unfortunately, unlike other macro 
variables, lost years in human life are irreversible, making it critical to address the human 
costs of the crisis. The first step is making those costs visible.    
  5
 
Box 1: Lessons from the Russian Financial Crisis 
 
The 1998 Russian financial crisis showed clearly how severely the economic downturn can hit 
poor and vulnerable groups of the population, especially women. In that case, economic 
destabilization went hand-in-hand with the sudden devaluation of the ruble, the collapse or near 
collapse of several large banks and financial institutions, and a sharp decline in exports and export 
revenues.  
In order to stabilize the economy, the government tightened budget spending and froze or 
cut many social welfare programs. The inability of the Kremlin to put together a coherent 
stabilization plan led to a sharp decline in public service spending, significantly undermining the 
quality of the healthcare and social welfare. Average public sector wages shrank to about USD 58 
per month and pensions to about USD 20 per month due to the near 30% devaluation of the ruble. 
Payment of wages and welfare benefits were delayed for many months. The official 
unemployment rate reached 14.2%, the highest ever officially reported in Russia, and the number 
of people living below the poverty line reached one-third of the population. The economy 
recovered within two years, but the general population continued to endure its effects. Some local 
media outlets reported that many pensioners, single mothers, and unemployed women went 
hungry for weeks and even months as food prices jumped by 100%.  
All of this makes clear that in the absence of a proactive strategy by women’s groups, 
government officials did not heed the needs or protect the rights of women. It illustrates the need 
for rights-based and gender-responsive actions, as well as public-private and government-NGO 
partnerships in developing policy responses. It also highlights the importance of local and 
community-based monitoring initiatives, which would be able to evaluate the efficiency of local 
governments in providing social services and identifying the most vulnerable groups.  
 
Sources: Pastor, Gonzalo C., and Damjanovic, Tatiana, Russian Financial Crisis and its Consequences for 
Central Asia. IMF Working Paper No. 01/169. Washington DC: IMF, 2001. IMF. Russian Federation--
Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/100. Washington DC. 
 
In the CIS/CEE region especially, the global financial and economic crisis will 
exacerbate already alarming increases in poverty and inequality, most recently owing to the 
2007–08 crisis in food and energy security, which also hit the region. Economic downturns 
generally affect women more than they do men, owing to the way they are integrated into the 
labor market and their more limited access to social benefits, such as pensions, social 
security, or unemployment compensation, as well as their greater responsibilities for 
household survival strategies (Dokmanovic 2008). While attention tends to focus on the job 
losses in construction and the auto industry, where men are predominant, sectors in which 
women predominate, such as agriculture and export-oriented assembly industries, have also 
been hard hit. Previous crises have shown that household and social tensions increase during 
periods of economic hardship, often resulting in increased social and domestic violence 
























Caught between a rock and a hard place, many developing countries cut their budgets 
in line with the austerity programs of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to stabilize their economies. In 
response to the global downturn, many of these countries, including those with financial 
support from IFIs, have implemented anticrisis measures of various kinds, including 
economic stimulus packages. However, the fiscal policy responses differ widely among the 
countries, as do the outcomes from a human development and gender equality perspective. 
The following section examines the overall macroeconomic environment, financial 
fragility, and relevant human development dimensions of countries in the CEE/CIS region. 
The third section discusses in detail the most vulnerable groups in these countries and lays 
out possible human and gendered effects of the crisis and of the responses to it. The last 
section takes account of our analysis and concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
THE CEE/CIS REGION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OVERVIEW 
 
In order to capture the impact of the economic crisis and of policies to address it on different 
groups, we have categorized countries in the region in terms of the prevalence of poverty as 
measured by the percentage of their populations living under the poverty line. Using the 
poverty level as our unit of analysis also highlights the gender-specific differences in the 
way in which poverty is experienced. As various authors have shown, as more and more 
women have entered the paid labor force over the last three decades, they have done so in 
highly unequal ways, occupying the least secure and well-paid sectors. Moreover, at the 
same time as women are contributing a greater share of household resources, their control of 
these resources has not necessarily increased, while their unpaid caregiving responsibilities 
have, in most cases, not decreased. For those who experience it, “feminized poverty” is less 
about an increase in income poverty relative to men as about an increase in other aspects of 
poverty, including time poverty, that limit women’s ability to realize their human potential to 
a greater extent than is true of men. It also has a long-lasting impact on future generations 
(see, e.g., Kabeer [1996]; UNIFEM [2000 and 2005]; Chant [2006 and 2008]).  
  Table 2 presents the key macroeconomic indicators for countries in the CEE and CIS 
region using World Bank and IMF data. It shows that poverty does not discriminate 
according to size of the country, level of per capita income, or geographical location The 
high poverty group includes countries which are resource rich, such as Russia (with a total 
real GDP of USD 1.3 trillion_, as well as those that are resource poor, such as Montenegro   
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(with a total real GDP of USD 3.9 billion). Nor is poverty a feature of income per capita. 
Ukraine has almost three times less income per capita (USD 3,069) than the Russian 
Federation (USD 9,079), but they both have same proportion of their populations who are 
poor and vulnerable (45%). Another example is between Poland with USD 11,143 and a 
poverty rate of 20.6 percent, and Lithuania with USD 11,522 income per capita but a much 
higher poverty rate of 36 percent.  
The World Bank (2005) identified purchasing power parity (PPP) USD 4.30 a day as 
the vulnerability threshold for the region, below which people are seen as at risk of 
becoming poor during a global downturn. Since the CEE and CIS region is experiencing its 
worst economic crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have adopted the (rounded off) 
figure of PPP USD 4 a day as the regional poverty and vulnerability threshold. We also 
concur with Reddy and Pogge (2005: 4) that “poverty estimates influence assessments of the 
seriousness of the problem, and the regions to which these resources should be directed.”  
The selection of USD 4 a day as the poverty line reflects two additional 
considerations. First, while the global poverty line used since the beginning of 2009 is USD 
2.15, this does not reflect even the average extent of poverty in this region due to additional 
material needs for protection from the cold climate.
3 The 1985 calculation of PPP USD 2 as 
the global poverty line was done on the basis of 33 countries, none in the CIS/CEE region 
(Reddy and Pogge 2005).
4 In addition, while national poverty lines may best capture living 
conditions for a given country, these vary from country to country, making it necessary to 
choose a single line that is comparable across all countries.  
However, using PPP USD 4 a day as the regional poverty line has some limitations, 
one of which is underestimating the numbers for some countries while overestimating them 
for others. As mentioned by the World Bank report, in some countries (such as Uzbekistan) 
the poverty rate is underestimated because of price controls in the 1990s and in others (such 
as Georgia) it is overestimated owing to hyperinflation around 1993. We recognize the 
limitations of using a 2004 poverty line, as poverty rates are likely to have changed in some 
countries, but these are the same limitations facing any study that uses statistics: we use the 
latest available numbers.  
In the CEE/CIS region, countries with poverty rates of 60 percent or higher are 
categorized in the extreme poverty group (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), those with poverty rates of 40–60 percent in the high 
                                                            
3 The poverty rate calculation in the ILO study is based on PPP USD 1 a day. 
4 The World Bank revised these numbers in 2001, using the 1993 PPP exchange rates. The PPP rates were 
again updated for the region in 1996 (World Bank 2005).   
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poverty group (Turkey, Kazakhstan, Romania, Albania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria), those with rates below 40 percent but higher than 15 percent 
in the intermediate poverty group (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Uzbekistan), and those with poverty rates 
below 15 percent in the low poverty group (Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia).  
Table 2 shows that with the exception of the Baltics (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), in 
2008 most countries were performing very well in terms of real GDP growth; the poorest 
group of countries had grown the fastest with an average of 7.7 percent as opposed to 4.9 
percent growth rate for the high poverty group, 2.5 percent for the medium poverty group, 
and 3.8 percent for the low poverty group. However, these high growth rates reversed after 
the financial crisis hit (see table 3). Most of the economies in the region have shrunk, 
especially countries such as Armenia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Estonia, which registered 
negative growth rates ranging between 14 and 19 percent. Despite the global downturn, a 
few economies are still growing, including Uzbekistan (7%), Turkmenistan (4%), Azerbaijan 
(8%), Tajikistan (2%), Kyrgyzstan (1.5%), Albania (0.7%), and Poland (1%).  
A high level of indebtedness in almost all of the CEE/CIS countries has a negative 
impact on the financial and economic outlook of the region as a whole, severely constraining 
the ability of all countries to respond to crisis. In 2009, more than USD 283 billion in total 
short-term debt came due and meeting the repayment obligations on these debts has been a 
challenging task for a number of countries (World Bank 2009). As of February 2009, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, and Latvia held insufficient international reserves to cover debt coming 
due. Kazakhstan, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria had short-term 
debt levels above 50 percent of their reserves. Net capital outflows forced many of the 
countries to sign standby agreements (SBAs) with the IMF, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following section. 
After the crisis hit, the degree of financial fragility increased for most, if not all, 
countries in the region. Based on the numbers in the IMF World Economic Outlook of 
October 2009, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan had experienced significant deterioration 
in their current account balances. Azerbaijan’s current account surplus of 36 percent of GDP 
is expected to decline to 20 percent of GDP, whereas Tajikistan’s current account deficit is 
expected to increase from -8 percent to -14 percent (see table 3). In most other countries, 
current account balances are expected to improve (IMF 2009). 
There are varying degrees of financial fragility for different countries within different 
poverty groups. From the initial financial indicators presented in table 4, we can say that the   
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average current account deficit for 2008 for extreme poverty countries is 2 percent of GDP 
with foreign reserves averaging 5 percent of their GDP. External debt stocks to gross 
national income (GNI) are 34 percent, of which 17 percent is short term (see table 4).  
Countries in the high poverty group have much higher current account deficits, 
averaging 11.2 percent of GDP with an average external debt stocks to GNI ratio of 54 
percent, and a slightly lower ratio of short-term debt in external debt (22.2%). The medium 
poverty group has an average of 8 percent current account deficit to GDP, an average of 54 
percent external debt to GNI ratio, and 33 percent of external debt is short term. It is only in 
the low poverty group that one can see significant differences, with an average 6 percent 
current account deficit, and an average of only 10 percent of short-term debt to external debt 
ratio.  
What does seem to correlate with poverty is the structure of the economy, in that 
countries with lower levels of poverty have a lower share of employment in agriculture. The 
average share of employment in agriculture for the extreme poverty group is 42 percent, vis-
à-vis 19 percent for the high poverty group, 11 percent for the medium poverty group, and 8 
percent for the low poverty group (see table 2). 
 
POVERTY, EMPLOYMENT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
The data in table 2 provide a clear message about the link between unemployment and 
poverty, showing that in countries with lower poverty rates, unemployment declines along 
with the rate of poverty. In countries with extreme poverty, official precrisis unemployment 
rates averaged 14 percent, a rate that falls approximately 2 percentage points as the poverty 
category improves, with the exception of the lowest poverty group, for which the average 
unemployment rate was 6 percent (down as much as 4 percentage points).
5  
The nature of employment is also important. In 2007, about 53 percent of women 
workers were located in part-time, temporary, or other forms of informal employment, 
compared to about 49 percent of male workers. Over a third of the female workforce (36%) 
were among the working poor compared to 30 percent of the male workforce (ILO 2009b).  
Informal work is characterized by little or no job security or social protection, often 
harmful working conditions, and generally inferior pay—all of which put informal 
employees “at risk” during economic downturns, and likely to be missed by policy 
                                                            
5 There are some important exceptions, including Turkey, which has a 10% official unemployment rate and a 
58% poverty rate. This compares with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has a high unemployment rate (36%), 
but a relatively low poverty rate (35%).    
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responses, such as extended unemployment insurance. Few women in the CEE/CIS region 
are in high productivity–high pay industry occupations; in 2008, only 18.8 percent of women 
worked in industry compared to 26.6 percent of men. Sectors in which women work in large 
numbers are those where labor productivity is hard to measure, namely, services and 
agriculture. Labor productivity is particularly low in agriculture, owing to scarcity of arable 
land and abundance of labor (Sen 1981; Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2004).  
Globally, women’s employment in wage and salaried jobs has increased over the last 
several decades, rising to 45.5 percent of the female labor force in 2007 from 41.8 percent in 
1997. At the same time, the increase in women’s self-employment, or own-account 
employment, grew faster, rising from 22.6 percent of the female labor force in 1997 to 28 
percent in 2007 (ILO 2009b). In the new millennium, the difference in the quality of new 
jobs for women and men is particularly striking: from 2000 to 2006 approximately two-
thirds of all new jobs for men were in the wage and salaried category; for women, more than 
two-thirds of all the new jobs were in the contributing family worker category (ILO 2009b).  
The situation is worse in developing countries, especially in Asia and Africa, where 
up to 80 percent of women workers are in vulnerable employment, mostly as unpaid family 
workers or as own-account workers. While this is not so pronounced in the CEE/CIS region, 
where full-time employment was once standard and there is greater social protection, some 
of the high-growth sectors of the last decade, such as textiles, have been fuelled largely by 
women’s home-based informal work (ILO 2009b).  
Women in developing countries have also been hard hit by the crisis—not only 
because of increased unemployment and declining incomes, but also because of the 
increased burden of unpaid work they are obliged to pick up. Economic downturns 
frequently lead to public spending cuts and increased user fees, at times on top of earlier 
privatization initiatives. This not only results in fewer public sector jobs, but also shifts the 
burden of care away from government-provided services towards households. Feminist 
economists have pointed out that while paid work is visible and largely recognized, unpaid 
work, such as household caregiving or unpaid work in family enterprises, is neither visible 
nor recognized, as it takes place out of the market, and is therefore not counted in national 
income accounts (Folbre 2001; Elson 1995; Elson and Cagatay 1999).  
These shifts also often increase the wage gap. A study of wages in Turkey showed 
that while men get higher wages in private rather than public sector jobs, women tend to get 
higher wages in public rather than private sector jobs (Tansel 1999). Thus the privatization 
of sectors that employ mostly women (such as education and healthcare) generally has a   
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serious negative impact on women’s paid labor compensation, as well as increasing 
women’s burden of unpaid labor.  
“Economic freedom, self-determination or... co-determination in resource 
distribution within the family is highest when women earn wages and salaries or are 
employers, lower when they are own-account workers and lowest when they are contributing 
family workers” (ILO 2009b: 11).  
Countries also vary widely in terms of levels of social spending and human 
development outcomes. Table 5 presents data on human development indicators for 
countries in this group. One of the most striking links it shows is that negative outcomes, 
such as maternal mortality and infant mortality, increase significantly with increased 
poverty. In the extreme-poverty group, for every 1,000 live births, an average of 45 babies 
die, compared to 23 in the high-poverty group, 14 in the medium-poverty group, and 5 in the 
low-poverty group. The same pattern is even more pronounced for maternal mortality rates; 
for every 100,000 live births, women in extreme-poverty countries are 16 times more likely 
to die in childbirth as those in low-poverty countries (94.14 versus 5.75). 
 It should be added that there does not seem to be a consistent relationship between 
the ratio of public spending on health as a percentage of GDP and human development 
outcomes. For example, in both Tajikistan and Romania, the share of GDP spent on public 
health is 3 percent, while the outcomes in terms of maternal mortality are very different (170 
deaths in Tajikistan and 24 in Romania). Even considering the total real GDP of their 
economies and taking their populations into consideration (22 million Romanians and 
roughly 7 million Tajiks), this raises questions about the importance of the quality of health 
care and how and where resources are used.  
Another variable that correlates with increased poverty in the region is increased 
inequality (see table 5). Poorer countries are more unequal in terms of per capita 
consumption than are richer countries. Thus, the poor are subject not only to abject poverty, 
but also to relative poverty, resulting in high levels of out-migration, particularly among 
women. This is likely to deepen as migrant workers have been among the first to lose jobs in 
receiving countries and many have already returned, joining the ranks of the unemployed.  
One phenomenon in all the countries in the region is the persistent gender pay gap, as 
illustrated by the ratio of female-to-male earned income. It is interesting to note that in 
Turkey, one of the middle-income countries in the region, female earnings constitute only 26 
percent of male earnings.  
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POLICY RESPONSES ACROSS FOUR POVERTY GROUPS IN THE CEE/CIS 
 
This section examines countries in each of the four poverty groups that, despite similar 
economic constraints, appear to have adopted very different policy responses. While it is 
important to note that the details of these responses are taken primarily from government 
statements, IMF agreements, World Bank publications, and the like, and that there is little 
information about the extent to which they are actually being implemented, they nevertheless 
reflect different political priorities and the influence of different constituencies—including 
governments, the private sector, international financial institutions, and, to some extent, civil 
society—in shaping these priorities. To assess the way in which these policy measures are 
likely to affect different groups, the paper first asks: Who are the poor in these countries? 
 
Extreme Poverty Group 
In managing the transition to market economies, countries in the extreme poverty group—
namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan—have taken a variety of different courses. Some, such as Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan, have been slow to undertake market-oriented reforms, maintaining firm control 
over their economic development; others, like Georgia have introduced these reforms in a 
stop-and-go way, while still others, like Azerbaijan, are considered to have taken a course of 
intermediate reforms. 
Among this group of countries, not only has the pace of transition varied, so too has 
the economic resource base on which they have conducted reforms. Azerbaijan is a resource- 
rich country whose export earnings allowed it to expand its economy and to achieve an 
impressive rate of economic growth before the crisis. The smallest and poorest countries 
(Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan), in which (with the exception of Tajikistan) 
reforms are quite advanced, have been struggling to attract sustained foreign investment, a 
key part of their national development strategies.  
What countries in this group have in common, in addition to high levels of poverty, is 
that they have become highly dependent on migration outflows, which have had a stabilizing 
effect on their labor markets and provided remittances that added substantially to their 
currency reserves. Tajikistan and Moldova in particular have very high ratios of remittances 
to GDP, at 45.5 percent and 38.3 percent, respectively. 
All of these countries have also adopted various anticrisis measures in response to the 
crisis. Among them, only Turkmenistan is funding these measures from domestic resources.   
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Kyrgyzstan has been able to draw on financial support from the Russian Federation, as well 
as its own resources. In addition, since December 2008, Kyrgyzstan has had an 18-month 
IMF Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) in the amount of USD$100 million.
6 The others—
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan—are financing their packages with loans from 
international financial institutions, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as the IMF.  
Despite their high levels of poverty, most of these countries are adopting measures to 
address the crisis and it is important to see the extent to which they have tried to protect poor 
and vulnerable groups.  
 
Who Are the Poor? 
Table 6 presents poverty, education, and employment data for each of the countries in the 
extreme poverty group. Column 1 shows the share of poor people among all rural or urban 
dwellers. The rest of the columns show the structure of poverty—the percentages indicate 
which group constitutes the highest share of poverty among all people in poverty. In 
extremely poor countries, the majority of people in poverty are rural people, working people, 
and retired people. This does not mean that unemployed people are not poor, but rather that 
the majority are the working poor.  
Within the extreme poverty group, where, on average, 76 percent of the population 
live in poverty, it is reasonable to assume that the poor are located in all sectors—
agriculture, manufacturing, services—and include both native and migrant households in 
both urban and rural areas.  
Looking first at Moldova, a small resource-poor country with a population of 3.8 
million, we see it has a poverty rate of 65 percent and its economy is projected to contract by 
9 percent in 2009 (see table 3). In 2008, Moldova had a current account deficit of 17 percent 
of its GDP. Currency reserves diminished by 35 percent from December 2008 to April 2009, 
and may totally diminish in the face of declining exports and remittances (Social Watch 
2009).  
  In terms of employment, people in wage work constitute 33 percent of people in 
poverty, while retired people make up another 31 percent (see table 6). Women’s 
unemployment in Moldova is extremely high (23.6%) compared to the total official 
                                                            
6 Current ESF in Kyrgyz Republic is in response to declining foreign finance in Kazak-owned banks, as well as 
easing the impacts of a recent earthquake, and helping with the electricity needs, which has become challenging 
as a result of falling water levels in the Toktogul reservoir, which provides 90% of all electricity (CEPR 
2009a).   
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unemployment rate (7.3%) in 2007. Thirty-three percent of employment is in agriculture and 
the poverty rate in rural areas is 87 percent. In 2008, Moldova’s per capita GDP was USD 
1,200 with a total real GDP of USD 4.4 billion (see table 2). The proportion of poor female-
headed households is one of the highest in the group as well (37%), primarily due to the 
extremely high female unemployment rate for the country (see table 6).  
Not surprisingly, remittances represent a major share of the country’s GDP; in 2008 
they constituted 38 percent of total GDP, one of the highest in the world. Studies have 
shown that remittances apparently reduce poverty in all regions (Lucas 2004; Adams 2005; 
World Bank 2006b). The same is true in Moldova, where they significantly contribute to 
household income, especially in households with children, where they are used in basic 
consumption items such as food and clothing.  
Women migrant workers comprise 56 percent of Moldovan migrant workers and 
contribute significantly to the economy. Most are from rural areas, aged between 30 and 40 
years and are (or have been) married and have children. About 60 percent of women stay in 
the countries of destination longer than one and one-half years. Migrant women who are in 
receiving countries illegally face an increased risk of morbidity, but are unable to access 
healthcare or other services. Their illegal status enhances their dependence on their 
employer, increasing the risk of sexual abuse (Eurostep 2009). 
In the face of increasing hardship as a result of the global economic crisis, the 
government applied to the IMF to finance a range of stimulus measures, none of which are 
gender sensitive or designed to protect vulnerable groups. On the contrary, in order to 
improve its current account imbalance, the government has kept the “zero quota” of 
corporate income tax that was introduced in 2008. As an IMF working paper points out, 
declines in corporate income tax rates in the region have raised concern, as it results in tax 
competition and a race to the bottom to attract foreign investment (Piatkowski and Jarmuzek 
2008). 
A more serious concern noted in the study is that reduced tax revenues on the 
corporate side may force countries to either reduce public spending or increase other 
discretionary taxes, as happened in Moldova. The government has introduced a fixed income 
tax of 15 percent for individuals and increased the value-added tax (VAT) by 2 percent from 
its previous level of 20 percent (Social Watch 2009).  
Responding to IMF conditions, the measures the government has taken so far seem to 
increase poverty and inequality without much probability of success in attracting foreign   
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investment, given the fragility of its economy and the ongoing political turmoil resulting 
from economic instability.  
Armenia is another small, resource-poor country where the highest proportion of the 
poor is in the economically nonactive working age category. Given an extremely high 
official unemployment rate of 36 percent, Armenia is somewhat different than other 
countries in the region. Like Moldova, however, Armenia has been affected by the crisis 
through a decline in remittances and capital inflows, especially from Russia, and was further 
hit by the collapse of commodity prices (CEPR 2009a). Armenia’s economy has now shrunk 
significantly, from 6.8 percent real GDP growth in 2008 to -15.6 percent in 2009 (see tables 
2 and 3).  
The IMF plays a crucial role in shaping macroeconomic policy in the countries to 
which it lends money. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) that were introduced in 
the region in the 1990s facilitated the transition to a market-oriented economy based on trade 
liberalization, free capital flows, financial deregulation, privatization, reduced state social 
spending, and the replacement of the ideal of “public goods” with that of “individual 
responsibility.” The IMF Standby Agreements and other forms of lending tend to focus on 
fiscal consolidation, banking reform, and restoring financial stability.  
As a result of the crisis, Armenia turned to the IMF, requesting a substitution of their 
ongoing Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) with a large Standby Agreement 
special drawing rights (SDR) 165.6 million (or around USD 258 million) (CEPR 2009ibid.). 
In Moldova, this agreement came with the condition that the government correct its fiscal 
imbalances. During the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) reviews, IMF staff 
advised Armenian authorities to remove already planned fiscal stimulus for 2008 and 2009, 
and to tighten monetary policy (CEPR 2009a). However, the Armenian government adopted 
a very different fiscal policy than that advised by the IMF and took different policy 
responses than did many other countries, such as Serbia and Czech Republic, which will be 
discussed in the following pages. It taxed luxury consumption goods of tobacco and 
imported alcohol, which not only have been shown to have negative social impacts, such as 
increasing the probability of nicotine-related illnesses and domestic violence, but are also 
considered to be consumed mostly by men (Koohi-Kamali 2008). Thus, whether or not it did 
so intentionally, the Armenian government has implemented a tax rate that favors female 
income earners. Contrary to the advice of the IMF, it reportedly also decided to raise tariffs 
on certain imports in order to improve its current account balance (CEPR 2009a).  
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A third country, Tajikistan, is also financing its economic stimulus package with 
loans from external sources, which in this case are extensive. On April 21, 2009, the 
government signed a three-year, USD 116 million arrangement under the PGRF with the 
IMF. The PRGF loan, together with grants to the budget from the Asian Development Bank, 
the European Union, and the World Bank, will help Tajikistan meet its financing needs. 
Tajikistan earns a majority of its export revenues through aluminum and cotton. A 
World Bank report on the cotton sector estimated that 56 percent of arable land is under 
cotton cultivation (World Bank 2004). The cotton sector employs a majority of the rural 
labor force, and cotton fiber exports comprise one-fifth of total export revenues, which 
makes it the second largest export commodity after aluminum. The global economic 
downturn has weakened the Tajik economy by reducing global demand for its major export 
commodities. Moreover, 45 percent of the country’s real GDP comes via remittances, also 
one of the world’s highest. As a result, the crisis has been transmitted to the economy 
primarily through declining exports and remittances, which have declined 30 percent (CEPR 
2009a). Since onset of the crisis, the Tajik somoni has depreciated by about 30 percent 
against the U.S. dollar and real GDP growth is expected to slow to 2 percent compared with 
8 percent in 2008 (CEPR 2009a; IMF 2009a). 
The poverty rate is extremely high in Tajikistan, with 85 percent of its population 
deprived of basic necessities. Rural poverty is higher than urban poverty and children under 
16 constitute the majority (76%) of the poor (see table 6). Arable land is scarce; it constitutes 
only 3 percent of the country’s total land, and, thus, developments in the agricultural sector 
have significant impacts on the livelihood of the majority (World Bank 2004). Given that 56 

























With substantial IFI financial support to stabilize its economy, Tajikistan has 
undertaken some major reforms. Its economic stimulus plan aims to alleviate the impact of 
the crisis on the population by increasing spending on education and health (particularly 
primary healthcare) by 1.5 percent of GDP in 2009, along with cash transfers to households. 
Given the high maternal mortality rate—170 women per 100,000 live births—this could 
have major benefits for women.  
The Tajik government has also announced its intention to reform the agricultural 
sector by addressing the cotton sector debt overhang and introducing a market-based 
financing mechanism to raise the sector’s growth potential. Its letter of intent notes that 
government will move to a private-sector-led financing mechanism, where farmers will have 
the ability to use land-use rights, not simply land ownership, as collateral. In the meantime, it 
will also open credit channels to noncotton growing farmers and allow banks to extend credit 
access to the whole agricultural sector, which would also motivate farmers to switch from 
cotton to other crops (Tajikistan Government, dated 3/31/2009). Crop switching may also 
have positive effects on food security in the region, since with easier access to credit for all 
agricultural crops, farmers may choose to grow food crops.  
Kyrgyzstan is a low-income, landlocked country with a population of 5.3 million 
people (World Bank 2008). Its major export items are gold, agricultural products, textiles, 
and energy products. Its official unemployment rate is the lowest (5%) among the extreme 
poverty group, largely due to out-migration. The country experienced robust growth in real 
GDP in 2008 (7.6%), but this is estimated to drop to 1.5 percent in 2009 (see tables 2 and 3). 
Box 2. Cotton Farming in Tajikistan 
 
For Farhod, as for other Tajik farmers, the problems began from his first days as an independent 
farmer three years ago, when the local collective farm, which dated from the Soviet era, was 
broken up. He was allotted, but does not own, 40 acres of land and a $5,000 debt carried over 
automatically from the farm’s arrears. Each year most of his profits go to working off the debt, 
which was assumed by a cotton trading company. The company maintains a monopoly over all 
cotton trade in the Shaartuz region and sells Farhod his supplies on credit—at inflated prices, he 
said—and then buys his production at below market prices.  
Under this system the farmers are perpetually strapped, as they never see any cash. Farhod 
and others say that what little they earn goes for food and other essentials, but since they have no 
money in hand, they are forced to buy from the trading company at inflated prices. “They pay us, 





The poverty rate in Kyrgyzstan is 73 percent and 37 percent of people living in 
poverty are self-employed. According to the Pan-European Regional Council, before the 
crisis, the sewing industry in Kyrgyzstan had been experiencing a boom, its exports 
primarily going to the Russian market. After the crisis, Moscow’s largest market, 
Cherkizovskij, closed, resulting in a reported 25 percent decline in orders to the Kyrgyzstan 
sewing industry. In 2001, there were 20,000 people working in light industry, expanding to 
200,000 in 2008. Now about 15,000 Kyrgyz workers sell their goods in Russian markets; 80 
percent are self-employed. Sewing “sweat shops” are located everywhere in country—in old 
factories, garages, private houses, and warehouses. In 2008–09, 1,245 workers were 
organized and 45 new organizations established.
7  
Based on the government’s letter of intent to the IMF in 2009, the impact of the crisis 
on Kyrgyzstan is due primarily to the economic slowdown in Russia and Kazakhstan, which 
resulted in reduced trade and remittance flows. It is anticipated that the slowdown in 
economic activity will create fiscal and current account imbalances that will spill over to 
2010. However, Kyrgyzstan is receiving USD 450 million in budget support from the 
Russian Federation, of which it intends to use USD 165 million during 2009. Kyrgyzstan is 
planning to allocate these funds to both capital investment and social spending. Even though 
not stated clearly, the letter of intent suggests that capital spending priorities will be given to 
medium-term projects and social spending will be focusing mostly on poverty reduction 
through direct cash transfers. It also notes that the government has increased pensions to 
offset inflation (CEPR 2009a).  
In addition to increased social protection through cash transfers, the government 
announced it will consider increasing revenue through a strengthened tax administration, 
along with some changes in the tax rates. According to the CEPR (2009a) report on IMF 
Standby Agreements in the region, the government is expected to decrease the VAT rate 
from 20 percent to 12 percent, while at the same time introducing a new property tax and 
other tax increases, as yet undefined.  
To some extent, Kyrgyzstan has recognized the importance of increasing social 
spending for vulnerable groups and introducing more progressive tax schemes. According to 
CEPR, the Social Fund expenditures are expected to rise from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2008 to 
5.9 percent in 2009. However, the report also notes that the government is scheduled to drop 
the public-sector wage bill from 7.2 percent in 2008 to 6.7 percent in 2009. Considering that 
                                                            
7 Available at: http:// perc.ituc-csi.org/spip?article280.   
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the second largest group of poor people after the self-employed are those who are wage 
employees, the wage reduction may have significant negative impacts on the poor.  
It is interesting to contrast the choices of different national governments in the same 
poverty group. Moldova and Armenia, both small, resource poor economies that are highly 
reliant on remittances, Moldova afflicted by political instability, Armenia by extremely high 
unemployment rates, both constrained by IFIs, yet choosing different policies, while 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both rural economies with high dependence on remittances, have 
been responding differently as well. As the latter relies less on IFI funds and is also burdened 
by higher external debt stocks, it has been adopting gender-sensitive policy responses that 
extend to its most vulnerable populations. However, Tajikistan has been implementing 
propoor policies as well, but in the Tajik case, it is important to emphasize the positive role 
of IFIs in working with the government to improve people’s lives by increasing social 
spending and supporting the government’s efforts to restructure its financial and agricultural 
sectors to assist the most vulnerable. 
 
HIGH-POVERTY GROUP  
 
As with the extreme poverty group, countries in the high poverty group (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine) differ 
in terms of their resources and degree of integration to the global economy. Russia and 
Kazakhstan are resource-rich countries with impressive growth rates. Bulgaria and Romania 
are the only EU member countries in the high-poverty group, while Albania, Montenegro, 
and Serbia are all prospective EU members.  
Among the high poverty group, those who relied on external funds (wholly or 
partially) for their economic stimulus packages are Romania (USD 17.1 billion from the 
IMF), Ukraine (USD 16.4 billion from the IMF), and Serbia (USD 4.53 billion from the 
IMF). EU assistance to its CEE member countries is mainly devoted to helping businesses 
deal with the crisis (EC 2009a). Under the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA), Serbia received general budget support to ease the economic and social consequences 
of the crisis for citizens.  
 
Who Are the Poor? 
One of the most significant differences between the high-poverty group and the extreme-
poverty group is the prevalence of poverty among female-headed households, who   
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disproportionately represent the poor in Ukraine and particularly in the Russian Federation 
(68%). Rural-urban poverty differences are also more pronounced than in the extreme 
poverty group (see table 7). Education would seem to be a good target of expanded public 
spending in this group, as the general pattern suggests that a large share (in some cases, the 
majority) of the poor have only a basic education.  
Kazakhstan is a resource rich country that produces natural gas and crude oil, and 
also exports textiles and agricultural products, particularly wheat and livestock. 
Kazakhstan’s economy grew at a rate of 3.2 percent in 2008 and is estimated to contract by 2 
percent in 2009 (see tables 2 and 3). 
The country has a poverty rate of 56.7 percent, with a higher rural poverty ratio of 67 
percent as opposed to 55 percent for urban poverty. Similar to Kyrgyzstan, self-employment 
is a high-poverty-risk occupation, as 27 percent of all people living in poverty are in this 
category, closely followed by wage employees, who constitute 25 percent of all the poor.  
However, women have a disadvantage in rural Kazakhstan as rural markets are 
segregated; being a woman worker not only reduces the chance of finding employment, but 
also results in lower wages compared to men (World Bank 2004). Also, due to the large size 
of the country, poverty has a spatial dimension in Kazakhstan; earnings are much lower in 
rural areas such as Akmola, North Kazakhstan, and East Kazakhstan, where infant and 
maternal mortality rates are also very high (World Bank 2004).  
One of the largest emerging economies along with Russia, Kazakhstan has, through 
two successive rounds, dedicated resources amounting to 10 percent of GDP to its 
emergency stimulus package (ESP) (Deutch Bank Research 2009) In September 2009, the 
Asian Development Bank provided USD 500 million to support construction projects in the 
country. Even though a significant portion of the funds were intended to be used for banking 
sector liquidity, aid for the real estate sector in Kazakhstan will also constitute a prominent 
share (DBR 2009). The government has also been providing funds to small and medium 
enterprises at low interest rates and this is supported by the government’s monetary policy: 
the central bank has cut interest rates to ease the credit crunch. 
While Kazakhstan had the highest external debt to GNI ratio (104) in the group 
(second highest in the entire study), it also seems to be the only country that has 

















According to a statement by the Kazakh prime minister (November 24, 2008), the 
government will increase the size of pensions, wages, and student scholarships by 25 percent 
in 2009 and 2010. The prime minister also noted that in 2010, government will increase state 
social allowances and special state allowances by 9 percent a year; increase monthly child 
allowances for children under one-year old by 250 percent; and increase one-time state-
funded child allowances for the birth of the fourth child and every next child by 50 percent. 
He further stated that the government will preserve jobs at large energy and resource 
extracting companies even in the case of production cuts and will generate employment in 
conjunction with the municipalities of Astana and Almaty through an infrastructure project 
called “100 schools and 100 hospitals.”  
One country, Turkey, is different than other countries in the high poverty group in 
many ways, except its rate of high poverty (58%). Turkey has not been undergoing market 
transition and is not an agrarian economy in terms of agriculture’s contribution to GDP 
(11.5%), although the share of employment in this sector is still very high (24%) (State 
Planning Organization 2009).  
Turkey is a middle-income country with per capita income of USD 8,984 and is the 
second largest economy in this study after the Russian Federation. A 2005 poverty study by 
the State Statistics Institute showed that rural poverty has been growing the fastest in the 
region, with 37 percent of those employed in agriculture living in poverty (State Institute of 
Statistics 2006b). The rural face of poverty increased following the adoption of the 
Agricultural Reform Implementation Programme in 2001; designed to reduce the role of 
 
Box 3. Social Protection Component in the Economic Stimulus Package (ESP) in 
Kazakhstan 
 
The government of Kazakhstan introduced the ESP in November 2008, allocating about 10 
billion US dollars (1,500 billion tenge), or about 5.5 percent of the national budget.  
The social protection component of the ESP in Kazakhstan includes: regular monitoring 
of sectors facing risk of mass layoffs; measures to provide jobs, training opportunities and social 
support to redundant workers; providing employment for the most vulnerable groups, 
particularly single mothers, families with more than three children, and people close to 
retirement age; creating a social insurance scheme to support recently laid-off workers; and 
creating 348,000 new jobs in 2009–10 through support to about 6,000 projects.  
 




government in agriculture by substituting government subsidies with direct cash income 
transfers to farmers, the program was phased out in 2008 (Unal 2009). 
Another feature of Turkey is its extremely low female labor force participation rate 
(28%) and a big gap in male and female earned income (SIS 2009a). Despite this low total, 
the average rural female labor participation rate is extremely high, at approximately 75 
percent (SIS 2009b). The majority of women (76 percent) who work in agriculture are 
unpaid family workers (SIS 2009c) and the sector is becoming more feminized as a result of 
male out-migration from rural areas in search of jobs, which is prevalent in many other parts 
of the developing world.
8  
The Turkish economy has been negatively affected by the global downturn, with real 
GDP growth declining from 0.9 percent in 2008 to -6.5 percent in 2009 (see tables 2 and 3). 
Its current account deficit is low, with only 5.7 percent of GDP in 2008, and is projected to 
be only 1.9 percent in 2009 (see tables 3 and 4). Moreover, the impact on employment has 
been tremendous: official unemployment increased from 10 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 
2009. 
To mitigate the impact of rising unemployment, the government extended 
unemployment compensation to workers with reduced hours from three to six months under 
the Reduced Working Hours Fund and increased the amount of the fund by 50 percent. It 
also took over 5 percent of the social security premium paid by employers. Anticrisis 
measures also included reduced VAT on household durables and a lowered real estate tax. 
In the face of widespread poverty and rising unemployment, Romania has used its 





























Before the crisis, Serbia had a high current account deficit (-17%), but a very 
favorable term structure in its external debt stocks (10%) compared to many countries 
examined here. As a result of reversals of capital inflows, the national currency has dropped 
25 percent compared to the euro in a short time, which prompted the government to seek 
external assistance from IFIs (Social Watch 2009). In January 2009, Serbia signed a 15-
month USD 530.3 million Standby Agreement to maintain economic and financial stability; 
a few months later, it signed another Standby Agreement worth USD 4 billion. In addition, it 
signed a World Bank loan worth USD 400 million for the development of private and 
financial sectors on October 5, 2009.
9  
Currently at 42 percent, poverty in Serbia is most common among retired people 
(39%), as well as among the Roma (World Bank 2003). In its letter of intent to the IMF, the 
government emphasized its willingness to follow a conservative fiscal policy, not using the 
funds unless absolutely necessary, agreed to adjust public sector wages by the projected 
inflation rate, and freeze nonessential public sector hiring (CEPR 2009a). When advised to 
increase taxes, however, the government refused.
10  
In February 2009, the government adopted an ESP that included some propoor 
measures, such as employer hiring incentives in order to increase jobs for the more 
                                                            
9 Serbian Government. (October 5, 2009). “World Bank to approve $400 million loan to Serbia”. Retrieved 
October 7, 2009. Available at: http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=59469 
10 Serbian Government (September 1, 2009). “Government reaches agreement with IMF”. Retrieved September 
2, 2009. Available at: http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=58485 
Box 4. Romania and Roma People 
Romania has been experiencing the negative impacts of the economic crisis through its 
decreasing exports (-25%) and reversal of capital flows, which started in 2003 as a result of 
increased integration of European economies. The official unemployment rate is currently 
5.7%, affecting some 500,000 people, almost half of which are women. In January 2009, the 
government announced that companies hiring unemployed persons, sole supporters of 
families, or persons over 50 years old would receive subsidies for a period up to 12 months in 
order to cover half of the salaries. The subsidies would also be used to support employment of 
Roma, and of those, due to education and low skills, have a lower competitive edge in the 
labor market. For people unemployed over two years, subsidies would cover 75 percent of 
salary up to 24 months. The scheme, which is worth a total of EUR 133 million, is 85 percent 
funded by the European Commission. Of this, 29 million is allocated for employment in rural 
areas. In March 2009, the government also decided to extend the unemployment insurance for 
three months, while employers and employees will be exempted for three months from paying 
social insurance contributions during temporary suspension of activities. 
Source: Social Watch (2009)   
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vulnerable groups. It announced that jobs for Roma people, older people (aged 45–50), and 
people who have been unemployed for at least two years would be subsidized up to USD 
2,200 (Social Watch 2009). In March it announced a temporary salary and pension tax of 6 
percent for those who earned more than USD 170. However, widespread protests resulted in 
its being revoked overnight and replaced by freezing salaries in state administration. Social 
mobilization spearheaded by trade unions was critical to this shift (Social Watch 2009).  
At the same time the government is took steps to cut spending on education, 
healthcare, and pension funds, and postponed implementation of the General Collective 
Bargaining Contract that covers all workers, allowing employers not to pay worker benefits 
and compensation (Social Watch 2009).
11 These steps were mostly due to the IMF’s 
emphasis of fiscal restraint by reducing the public wage bill and its insistence on liberalizing 
the markets through privatization (CEPR 2009a).  
 
MEDIUM POVERTY GROUP 
 
Five of the countries in this group are EU members—Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland—and two are prospective EU members—Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR 
Macedonia (see table 8).  
After September 2008 and the freezing of world financial markets, CEE countries 
found themselves with little or no access to finance. In October 2008, Hungary applied to the 
IMF for emergency support. The IMF responded with new Standby Agreements to four 
countries: Hungary (USD 15.7 billion), Latvia (USD 2.35 billion), Belarus (USD 2.46 
billion), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (USD 1.52 billion). Poland received USD 20.58 billion 
under the Flexible Credit Line,
12 with an additional USD 2.55 loan by the World Bank.  
Countries in this group, too, have taken different measures to mitigate effects in the 
social sphere. Hungary, for example, has continued to pursue further fiscal tightening by 
serious cuts in allocation for social services, and cutting social benefits and the number of 
jobs in the public sector, including healthcare and education. Poland and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, on the other hand, have developed more beneficial social welfare packages 
targeting the most vulnerable, whereas Latvia could do nothing for the reasons we will 
elaborate in this section.  
                                                            
11 Accepting the call to unite in times of crisis, Serbian trade unions agreed to the postponement (Social Watch 
2009).  
12 In March 2009, the IMF introduced the new Flexible Credit Line for crisis prevention or resolution for 
countries with strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks. See: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2009/032409.htm   
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Who Are the Poor? 
As table 8 shows, poverty in these countries primarily affects people in rural areas, 
especially adults in the 17–65 age group, although in Hungary most of those living in 
poverty are below age 16. In Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus a disproportionate 
number of poor households are female. Education appears to be linked to the incidence of 
poverty: in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and FYR Macedonia, those who have only primary 
basic education constitute a disproportionate number of the poor, 55 percent, 49 percent, 49 
percent, and 63 percent, respectively. 
Poor people in this group occupy diverse positions in the labor market. In Lithuania, 
19 percent are either self-employed or retired, whereas in Belarus and Estonia 44 percent and 
35 percent of people in poverty, respectively, are in wage employment. In Latvia, 
unemployment seems to be more common among the poor (31%), although earning a wage 
does not guarantee freedom from poverty, as 21 percent of all the poor are in wage 
employment. In Poland, unemployed persons constitute 29 percent of the poor. In FYR 
Macedonia, almost half of the poor are not economically active. 
The three Baltic countries—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—are the only ones that 
showed negative real GDP growth rates in 2008 (see table 1). What is even more alarming is 
that for 2009, the IMF estimates double-digit contractions in their economies.
13 In all three 
countries, real GDP growth was spectacular in the three years before 2008—in Latvia, 8.7 
percent, 12.2 percent, and 10 percent (IMF 2009a). A question to ask here is what accounts 
for such a dramatic reversal?  
Some analysts have argued that the reason for the collapse of the Baltic countries 
(including Latvia) was the nature of the transition to a market economy: specifically, 
financial liberalization that happened too fast and was out of line with the economy’s 
productive capacity and competitiveness, resulting in greater regional and social inequality, 
financial fragility resulting from large flows of foreign investment, and unsustainable current 
account deficits resulting from fast-growing private and public debt (see Tiits et al. [2008]). 
In 2006, Latvia’s trade deficits reached 20 percent of GDP. Its gross external-debt-to-GDP 
ratio rose from 114.7 percent in 2006 to 150 percent in 2007, falling to 134 percent in 2008 
(CEPR 2009b). However, domestically fueled consumption growth based on foreign 
borrowing collapses when high levels of debt lead to expectations of loan defaults, as has 




On December 23, 2008, Latvia signed a 27-month, USD 2.35 billion Standby 
Agreement with the IMF. It also received funds from the EU (USD 4.3 billion) and Nordic 
countries (USD 2.5 billion) among others (CEPR 2009b). Due to its high external debt, the 
government agreed to EU demands that it adopt a pegged exchange rate (in which the value 
of domestic currency is pegged to a foreign currency or a basket of foreign currencies).  
Pegged exchange rate regimes can help simplify trade transactions between major 
trading partners, especially when trust in the currency of one of the partners has deteriorated, 
which was the case with Latvia. At the same time, they reduce the capacity of the state to 
adopt an independent monetary policy to deal with macroeconomic instability because 
domestic money supply depends on foreign reserves. The central bank has to keep a certain 
level of foreign reserves to protect the peg, which limits its ability to withstand capital 
outflows and declining foreign reserves. This could mean a shrinking money supply, which, 
in turn, affects the real economy. An option in the face of declining foreign reserves is 
currency devaluation to improve current account imbalances. However, this is not feasible in 
Latvia, as a large proportion of consumer debt is denominated in foreign currency. Since 
countercyclical fiscal policy is restricted by the large public debt, Latvia is left with little 
room to breathe, let alone move.  
While it is true that Latvia could have contained these difficulties had it used its 
policy space to intervene quickly in its domestic markets to prevent excessive consumer 
borrowing and stabilize its economy (Tiits et al. 2008), it is also important to note that the 
IMF Standby Agreements have followed the usual procyclical recipe of cuts in government 
spending and prioritizing financial stability by maintaining the currency peg (CEPR 2009b), 
limiting Latvia’s ability to protect its citizens from the impact of the crisis going forward.  
 
LOW POVERTY GROUP  
 
Among the low poverty group (Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Czech Republic are EU members, and Croatia is a prospective EU member.  
All of the countries in the low poverty group are financially sound according to 
macroeconomic indicators. Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic had real 
GDP growth rates of 6.4 percent, 3.5 percent, 2.4 percent, and 2.7 percent, respectively (see 
table 2). In 2008, before the crisis hit, the four had an average of 6.13 percent current 
account deficit compared to GDP, as well as positive net capital inflows, low inflation rates, 
(3–4%) and, with the exception of Croatia, relatively low unemployment rates. Real per   
  27
capita GDP in all four was above USD 13,000 in 2008. Croatia had a high external-debt-
stock-to-GNI ratio, but the term structure was favorable with only 10 percent to be paid in 
the short term (see table 4).  
 
Who Are the Poor?  
According to a World Bank study in 2007, poverty in Croatia is linked to people’s labor 
market position: people in poverty comprise mostly unemployed, economically inactive, and 
retired people. Additional correlates are household size (more than 4 people) and educational 
attainment (below secondary school). The study also notes that female-headed households 
are more likely to be poor than male-headed households. Considering that one-third of 
Croatia’s population lives in female-headed households, this poses a significant problem. 
Particularly in households where the head of the household is 65 years or more, the poverty 
incidence increases to 26 percent as opposed to 12 percent and 30 percent in urban and rural 
areas, respectively. 
Another important dimension of poverty in Croatia is the lack of social mobility; 
poverty is stable over the life cycle and begins to rise sharply after 55 (World Bank 2007).  
In both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, where poverty rates are very 
low, poverty is more common among the socially excluded, notably the Roma people. The 
vulnerability of Roma people during economic downturns is particularly acute, as they have 
no access to social safety nets.  
There are 250,000 Roma living in the Czech Republic and more than 120,000 in 
Slovakia. Not all Roma are socially excluded, but a 2009 Social Watch report states that 
80,000 of 250,000 Roma in the Czech Republic were trapped in some 300 socially excluded 
communities, while in Slovakia, Roma live in poor conditions with little or no access to 
basic services such as water and electricity.  
Another feature of countries in the low poverty group is their higher spending on 
health and education, followed by relatively positive health outcomes with significantly 
lower maternal and infant mortality rates compared to other countries in the study (see table 
5). The countries are also similar in terms of their export to import ratios (close to 1). In 
2009, the IMF has estimated negative real growth rates for all of them, averaging around a 
contraction of 4.7 percent of GDP.  
Despite the similarities in economic outlook, from a human development standpoint, 
these countries responded to the economic crisis in very different ways. Croatia, which has 
the highest official unemployment rate of all four countries, received World Bank and   
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EBRD loans to finance its economic stimulus package. Among the measures it has taken to 
balance its budget are the imposition of user fees on healthcare (including antenatal care) and 
a 6 percent reduction in the public sector wage bill. State budget expenditure on capital 
investment has also been cut, while tax measures include a VAT increase from 22 to 23 
percent and an additional payroll tax of 2 percent for salaries, pension, and capital gains 
equal or below USD 618 and 4 percent above USD 1,236 (Darvas 2009). 
Slovakia, which is home to major automotive industry plants for Kia, Peugeot, and 
Volkswagen, is under the EC Temporary Scheme that provides member states with funds to 
implement measures to cope with the present economic crisis. Slovakia has implemented 
propoor, countercyclical policies in response to the crisis and has accelerated public 
infrastructure projects and taken steps towards progressive taxation by reducing the tax rates 
for the low-income employees. In addition to tax breaks to businesses, the government is 
also trying to stimulate the economy through speeding up payments and reducing business 
bureaucratic procedures.  
The commitment of the Slovak government to protecting its population against the 
negative impact of the crisis included building cooperation among all social groups. A crisis 
committee has been formed—made up of representatives from the government, central bank, 
commercial banks, trade unions, employers, municipalities, and parliamentary opposition—
to analyze the impacts of, and offer solutions to, the crisis (Social Watch 2009). On the other 
hand, despite the inclusion of a wide range of organizations and interest groups in this 
committee, there are no targeted efforts to improve the conditions of its most vulnerable 
constituency, the Roma people.  
The economic stimulus package adopted by the Czech Republic, which is not 
dependent on external borrowing to finance it, is mixed. It includes some procyclical 
policies, which are neither propoor nor gender-sensitive, including reducing budgetary 
allocations and downsizing public sector employment, as well as privatizing parts of the 
healthcare sector. Privatizing healthcare at this economically challenging time is bound to 
hurt the poorest households for whom access to public healthcare is essential. It also has 
important negative implications for women, as noted earlier, through lost jobs, widened 
gender wage gap, and increased unpaid work.  
Another measure the government has implemented is the introduction of a regressive 
tax reform, including decreasing the tax rates for the wealthier groups while increasing the 
VAT (Social Watch 2009). Some propoor measures have been implemented as well, 
including higher welfare benefits for the unemployed, better protection of workers in   
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bankrupt firms, and larger tax deductions for families with children. There were also some 
attempts to include its most vulnerable population, the Roma, but efforts were not followed 
up.  
In January 2008 the Agency for Social Inclusion in Roma localities opened its doors 
with a mandate to raise Roma standards of living and facilitate their inclusion in Czech 
society. The main vehicle for this was meant to be through funding for immediate purchases 
of services. However, the government ordered the agency to establish a framework for 
cooperation with interested parties in each region before ordering any services. The staff 
spent the entire year on this task, after which an internal audit concluded that the agency’s 
approach violated Cabinet policies. 
Overall, it appears that the differences between Slovak and Czech policies stem from 
the presence of different voices in the political decision-making process. In Slovakia, all of 
those who were part of the policy response discussions appear to have benefited from state’s 




The World Bank warns that the global economic and financial crisis could push another 53 
million people into poverty in 2009—on top of the 100 million impoverished by the food 
and energy crises in 2008. The financial crisis has had a particularly devastating effect on the 
CEE and CIS region, with an estimated 35 million people expected to be pushed into poverty 
in 2009. The Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness agendas, along with the 
promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), are designed to assist countries 
in mobilizing resources and using them more effectively for development. At the same time, 
international finance institutions and donor and partner governments, including those hardest 
hit by the economic downturn, risk basing recovery on the same models of growth and 
investment that have been accompanied by increasing inequality, nationally and globally, 
and led to the current crisis (see Antonopoulos [2009]; Seguino [2009]). 
As this study shows, governments with the same macroeconomic fundamentals and 
similarly limited fiscal space nevertheless adopt different policy mixes, which also 
differentially impact different groups of people. In addition, the IFIs, whose prescriptions 
have to a large extent shaped the degree of fiscal space in which governments can operate, 
have responded to appeals for standby lending from countries in the region in very different 
ways.    
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In the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the provision by both governments of 
cash transfers to poor families with children will go some way towards mitigating the impact 
of the crisis on vulnerable groups, including poor women and children. As a result of 
sustained social spending on health and education, the human costs of the financial crisis are 
likely to be very different in these countries than they are in Moldova, which is addressing 
its current account imbalances by taxing the poor on the same basis as the rich, or in the 
Czech Republic, which has cut spending on education, privatized parts of its healthcare 
system, and introduced new user fees for healthcare.  
Serbia has embraced foreign borrowing in response to the crisis, along with a freeze 
on wages in the state administration, cuts in public spending, and public sector reform. By 
contrast, Armenia has so far been trying to improve its current account imbalance through 
increased tariffs, which the IMF advised against. In some countries, notably the Slovak 
Republic, propoor policies have been adopted and could be further strengthened by 
extending them to the socially excluded groups and populations, such as the Roma people, 
who are rarely, if ever, included in policy discussions.  
This paper has emphasized that low-income working people in the region have been 
most seriously affected by the global downturn, perhaps especially the lower middle class, 
many of whom have lost not only jobs, but also a large part of their assets. To be effective, 
fiscal policies to counter the impact of the crisis must be informed by an awareness of who 
these groups are, where they live, what sectors they work in, what kind of households they 
live in, and so on, since the outcomes of policies depend on careful targeting. There is a need 
for an effective policy monitoring process, in which women’s organizations and national 
women’s machineries, supported by UN and donor partners, can play a meaningful role.  
Some countries need very specific attention to very specific issues; for example 
Moldova and Tajikistan, for which remittances constitute a large source of foreign reserves 
and for which worker out-migration represents a large share of employment opportunities. 
Protection of migrant-worker rights requires international collaboration both on the sending 
and receiving side of the migrant labor stream. Further, considering that most of the migrant 
workers and their families come from rural areas, the home countries need to increase 
spending on rural social and physical infrastructure projects and rural employment programs, 
along the lines of India’s government-subsidized National Rural Employment Guarantee 
(NREG).  
Some countries, for example, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have very particular 
problems, such as the monopoly of the agricultural sector by cotton farmers in Tajikistan and   
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high poverty rates among people engaged in small and medium enterprises in both countries. 
As in many cases, these particular problems may hide particular opportunities. For example, 
since the majority of poor farmers in Tajikistan are producing cotton, locked into what 
amounts to debt servitude, policies designed to eliminate the virtual monopoly of large 
farmers over the sector and encourage greater agricultural diversification are likely to be 
cost-effective in dealing with poverty. In collaboration with the international community, 
Tajikistan is taking steps towards that end, although the failure of developed countries to 
eliminate their agricultural subsidies is likely continue to frustrate their efforts. To some 
extent Tajikistan’s decisions during the transition years, including not to invest in 
agricultural modernization and to implement big cuts in social spending, have limited the 
country’s options in dealing with the impact of the crisis.  
It is important to ease poverty through short-term programs—such as cash transfers 
and child allowances—as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A longer-term solution, however, 
is to decrease poverty through public-private cooperation in employment generation and 
social protection systems, in which private enterprises should take a greater corporate social 
responsibility. Moreover, short-term measures should not contradict longer-term 
development strategies and should be designed as steps towards such strategies.  
Generating meaningful and long-term employment opportunities and pursuing 
policies to accomplish this purpose is an important aspect of decreasing the human cost of 
the global downturn. Kazakhstan has been implementing public sector employment 
programs through infrastructure projects (schools and hospitals). Other countries have been 
giving incentives to private businesses to generate employment; Serbia and Romania for 
example, have been providing incentives to businesses when they hire workers who are 
socially and economically excluded, like the Roma people or structurally unemployed 
people with longer periods of unemployment history. However, without creating a healthy 
economic environment, these measures are unlikely to have any positive impact, as 
companies still prioritize cost reduction and layoffs in order to survive the crisis. 
It is also important to note that all policies have gendered impacts. While 
infrastructure construction tends to provide jobs primarily for men, the kinds of 
infrastructure constructed, including schools, clinics, rural markets, and even roads to reach 
these new facilities also benefit women, including those who will work in them. To increase 
women’s access to decent work and livelihood opportunities, as well as avoid the repeated 
reliance on women’s unpaid labor to manage household survival strategies, it is crucial to 
investigate how each aspect of the response will impact on women and ensure gender-  
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specific targeted investments, either through public spending or incentives to private 
businesses. It is also important to link new employment opportunities to education and skills 
training in order to enable women to compete for these jobs equally with men.  
In most countries, including CIS and CEE countries, women’s groups and national 
women’s machineries have not been involved in the process of developing policy responses 
to the crisis, including economic stimulus packages, making it particularly important that 
they investigate their provisions and monitor their outcomes. 
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis of the gender-specific impact of the crisis 
and of policy responses in CIS/CEE was heavily constrained by the lack of sex-
disaggregated data. Such data is essential to be able to design gender-differentiated policies 




This analysis of how poor and vulnerable citizens are faring in the context of the economic 
and financial crisis identifies partial policy responses and indicators that need to be taken 
into account in designing responses to ensure that these groups are not put at further risk, 
with setbacks to national development that will be very difficult to reverse.  
Gender equality and women’s empowerment are essential in order to achieve 
equitable and effective development and to foster a vibrant economy. The financial and 
economic crisis should not be an excuse for countries to backtrack on commitments to 
gender equality and poverty reduction. The governments are obliged to fully respect and 
implement their commitments that derive from the Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 
and other international human rights documents. It is essential that anticrisis policy 
responses, stimulus packages, and other measures take into account differentiated impacts 
based on gender (including through gender-responsive budgeting) and that both immediate 
and long-term measures respond to the needs of women as well as men.  
The recommendations below focus primarily on gender equality priorities that need 
to be targeted in responding to the crisis, while appendix A, “Towards a Broader Policy 
Response,” explores the kind of economic restructuring needed to make that possible. 
Expansionary fiscal policy must be countercyclical. Progressive tax systems that 
compensate for gender biases in revenue collection should be developed along with   
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measures to enhance tax revenues, including more equitable and efficient tax collection, 
reducing tax evasion and broadening the tax base. 
Economic stimulus packages should place a priority on job creation and/or retention 
through employment guarantee programs, not only in the private sector, but also in the 
public sector where so many women are still employed. Enforcement of minimum wage 
regulations and adoption and implementation of equal pay for equal work policies should 
also be part of the policy response mix.  
Public spending measures should support gender-sensitive investments in social, as 
well as physical, infrastructure and include measures to support vulnerable groups, such as 
migrant women. 
Support to individuals should especially target individuals in low-income 
households; in addition to supporting those who manage household resources, who are 
generally women, such measures are most effective as poor and low-income individuals 
have a higher per capita consumption rate.  
Declining incomes and cuts in public spending have increased the burden on 
women’s unpaid labor to fill the gaps in household maintenance and food security, in child 
and elder care, and education. Taking into account their absorptive capacities, greater 
attention should also be paid to the needs of low-income caregivers. Support to individuals 
should include measures to support formal, informal, and unpaid care givers, such as 
including them in unemployment benefits.  
Rising unemployment rates particularly affect migrant workers, half of whom are 
women. Joint initiatives between countries of origin and destination are necessary to assure 
protection of the rights of migrant workers and their families. Unemployment schemes in 
countries of origin and destination should extend to migrants and return migrants who have 
lost their jobs. Regional coordinated responses are necessary in the countries of CIS, where 
migration and trade routes underline interdependence of the countries.  
Once undone, progress on development goals cannot easily be recovered without 
considerable reinvestment and political recommitment. Human development is a long-term 
investment carrying high long-term individual and social returns. Countries in the CEE/CIS 
region have experienced major setbacks in social indicators such as health and education and 
many of them face the same development challenges as poor and low-income countries. 
Donor coordination and support to the most vulnerable populations across the countries, but 
especially the most financially fragile, are essential, including through well-resourced 
multidonor initiatives.    
  34
Bilateral and multilateral donor agencies must increase commitments to development 
assistance that promotes gender equality and women’s empowerment, through both gender 
mainstreaming and targeted activities, and strengthen mechanisms to effectively measure 
resources allocated to incorporating gender perspectives in all areas of development 
assistance. Indicators for gender-sensitive stimulus packages need to be developed, tracked, 
and monitored.  
Given their central role in providing needed finance, it is also important to ensure 
that the IFIs take gender perspectives into account in loan approvals, debt servicing, and debt 
relief equality. All onerous debts should be reviewed and cancelled, as they burden national 
economies and their capacity to overcome the crisis. By allowing more policy space to 
countries hard hit by the crisis, IFIs would contribute to their economic recovery. 
These policies and their implementation can only be assured when decisions are 
made in a transparent and inclusive manner, with monitoring mechanisms in place. 
Nationally owned and driven initiatives are essential to assure that policies respond to the 
real needs of the country and the most vulnerable populations within them. This requires 
sustained advocacy and informed demands by gender equality advocates and women’s 
groups. Support to women’s organizing should be matched by strengthened investments in 
national institutions, including national women’s machineries, to assure policies are 
gendered and monitored. In addition, the women’s machineries need to be better positioned 
in policy and budget formulation and crisis response processes, as well as public finance 
management, to assure that needs of women are adequately addressed. 
As is often stated, crises also provide opportunities. It is important that the measures 
undertaken are not only consistent with long-term measures but also set a direction that 
addresses long-term structural problems of the economy (A Global Jobs Pact is one of the 
UN Joint Initiatives to respond to the crisis). This requires tackling labor market segregation 
and creating decent work for women distributed across rural and urban settings and different 
social groups.  
 For countries with a heavy economic concentration in the rural sector, long-term 
planning also means a rebalancing of the sectors and investment, especially private and 
foreign direct investments, in industrial policy to reduce the commodity dependence and 
broaden the employment base for women. 
Agricultural and trade policies should be formulated and implemented with the goal 
of assuring food security. Ownership of land and productive assets by both men and women 
needs to be protected to prevent deepening of poverty. In countries that are predominantly   
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rural and where agriculture is a major source of employment (especially for women), special 
attention should be given to the classification of unemployment and the eligibility for 
support that take into account female farmers and agricultural workers. For countries with 
high farmer indebtedness, special funds and financing mechanisms need to be put in place to 
address the problem of agricultural debt. Financial sector reform should ensure that small 





Towards a Broader Policy Response 
Barbara Adams and Karen Judd 
 
The review of policy responses to the economic and financial crises in central and eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) compares countries 
across different levels of poverty to see the extent to which these responses protect their most 
vulnerable populations, including poor women, rural women, and those excluded from 
economic and political life. In so doing, it highlighted policies that advance national and 
global commitments to gender equality, such as those made in the Beijing Platform for 
Action in 1995. 
Women’s work in the household and community constitutes an unpaid “care 
economy” that has traditionally been the de facto shock absorber in economic downturns, 
filling the gaps caused by falling household income and cuts in public services. In the CEE 
and CIS region, its absorption capacity was hard squeezed even before the financial and 
economic crisis, given the shock therapy measures of the transition and the ongoing impact of 
the food and fuel crises. With the onset of the financial and economic crisis, it has now 
reached a breaking point. A recent World Bank (2009c) study points to the multiple impacts 
the crisis has had on households in the region and indicates concern that “compared to 
previous crises, the scope for households to engage in traditional coping mechanisms is more 
limited.”  
The review of these multiple impacts on and within households, and of policy 
measures to address them, makes clear that effective and sustainable policy responses must 
focus on three broad and interrelated objectives, each of which has gender dimensions:  
 
1. Establishing a social protection floor, with coverage for all segments of the 
population, including poor and vulnerable groups, as well as those socially excluded. 
The UN Joint Crisis Initiatives paper points to increasing examples of the role of social 
protection in reducing poverty in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, with much quicker results 
than from economic trickle-down policies, and notes that for a low-income country, even a 
basic social security system can make the difference in whether poverty reduction goals are   
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achieved. Findings from an ILO study of seven African and five Asian countries indicate that 
social security systems not only should but could be established affordably (ILO 2008).  
While almost all countries provide some form of social security, few provide a basic 
social protection floor for all citizens, including the vast majority of the working poor. A 
recent report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
found that 1.8 billion people, or more than half of the global labor force, are working without 
a formal labor contract or social security, compared to 1.2 billion with formal contracts and 
social security protection. While this has not been so serious in the CEE/CIS region, where a 
large proportion of the population continues to work in public sector jobs that include social 
security protection, the pressure on countries to “reform” pension systems and reduce 
payments to retirees has increased as a condition of loan packages, particularly in CEE 
countries, which have relatively large shares of elderly and retired people in their 
populations.  
 
2. Prioritizing job creation and retention, as well as decent work opportunities as the 
drivers of sustainable recovery. Studies have found that investments in employment-
intensive areas are greater than consumer tax cuts, across-the-board-spending increases, or 
hiring subsidies to firms. Effective measures include public employment programs and 
specific programs for vulnerable groups, including women, youth, and migrant workers. 
Additional measures can include employment guarantees, minimum wage legislation, and the 
protection of workers’ rights, as well as provision of affordable childcare and social services 
to reduce women’s unpaid work. Investment in new technologies, including green 
technology, should also be accompanied by information and skills training targeted to women 
to enable them to compete equally with men for the new job opportunities.  
 
3. Targeting public investment to social as well as physical infrastructure that can 
enable women to contribute more productively to the economy and reduce their time 
poverty, especially in rural areas. Investing in women is, as the World Bank says, “smart 
economics.” Such investment, some of which is already starting in the region, would include 
the construction of schools, hospitals and clinics, especially in rural areas, as well as 
construction and repair of farm-to-market roads, rural storage facilities, irrigation systems, 
portable water systems, and other farm projects that will further poverty reduction, provide 
long term advantages to large numbers of women in agriculture, and opportunities for 
migrant workers returning to rural areas. The UN Green Economy Initiative calls for   
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infrastructure investment to reduce the threat of food, water, energy, and environmental 
crises, which have disproportionate impacts on the poor, especially poor women. As the ILO 
points out, “priorities should not only be on infrastructure projects which create jobs in the 
short term but social investments in care services which reduce the pressure on women 
performing unpaid work” (ILO 2009b).  
 
How can these policies be pursued in the context of the economic and financial crisis?  
As the review of impact of the crisis in CEE and CIS reports, net financial inflows, including 
remittances and foreign direct investment, are decreasing in most countries in the region, 
economic growth has declined, and exports are down. In 2009, the rate of growth of GDP in 
the CIS is projected to be -6.7 percent, the world’s largest decline, while that in the CEE is 
estimated to be -5 percent, the third largest decline. This contraction in economic growth, 
coupled with declining demand for exports and the near-exhaustion of major privatization 
opportunities, has also led to significant reductions in foreign investment. The number of 
unemployed people in the CIS and non-EU countries of the CEE could reach as much as 21.7 
million in 2008, an increase of 35 percent over 2008. 
Poverty in both the CIS and CEE was already increasing as a result of the food and 
energy crisis in 2007–08 and has been predicted to increase by 5 million people for every 1 
percent decline in GDP. This is likely to affect women particularly, owing to the unequal way 
they are integrated into the labor market and their more limited access to social benefits, such 
as social security, pensions, and unemployment benefits. As GDP declines, cuts in public 
spending not only result in added job losses for women, but also greatly increase the unpaid 
labor needed to make up for the loss of public services, particularly in education and health 
care. 
The impact of the crisis has put pressure on the policy and fiscal space of all 
countries, depending on the vulnerability of the economy and the multiple ways the crisis is 
being transmitted to it. Countries in CEE/CIS countries vary widely in terms of their 
structural vulnerability, ranging from heavily indebted/speedily integrating economies to 
poor, commodity-based economies that are dependent on external assistance for social 
investment. Their options in the current situation vary accordingly. For example: 
 
1. New and prospective EU member countries have pursued polices of opening their 
economies to further their integration into a larger market. As the credit market froze in 
developed countries, they experienced a dramatic drop in demand for their exports and   
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declining investment flows, creating pressure on their currencies and interest rates, in some 
cases resulting in a destabilizing increase in indebtedness. 
  
2. Poor, primarily agricultural economies with high levels of out-migration have increasingly 
relied on remittances, which in recent years have contributed more to the economy than 
foreign investment; in Tajikistan for example the ratio of remittances to GDP was 45.5 
percent and in Moldova it is 38.3 percent. The sharp drop in remittances—which the World 
Bank estimates may up to 15 percent in central Asia in 2009—has seriously strained 
household coping strategies. The influx of returning migrant workers without jobs adds to the 
pressure on the informal economy and further reduces the already meager earnings it 
provides. 
 
3. Resource-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, while experiencing a 
drop in demand, have been buffered by continuing demand and foreign currency earnings. 
These countries are now facing critical decisions on how to use and protect policy space. 
 
All countries in the region face the challenge of how to raise and manage revenues 
needed to expand fiscal policy in the face of rising deficits and increasing external debt. 
While a sustainable economy ultimately depends on effective domestic resource 
mobilization, including more efficient and equitable tax policies, almost all countries in the 
region rely on external resources to some extent, either as grants or loans. According to 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC), official development assistance (ODA) flows to the poorest 
countries in the region are low compared to other regions; a priority for these countries is to 
secure increased support from the international community to strengthen national capacities 
for implementation of their social protection and poverty reduction policies.  
Many countries have loan agreements with the IMF, most of them put in place during 
the last year in response to the financial crisis. In negotiating these agreements, it is important 
that both national governments and the IMF place a higher priority on social policy 
objectives, including job creation and social protection. One striking characteristic of many 
countries in the region before the financial crisis was their degree of indebtedness. This has 
been worsened by factors beyond their control, yet they lack a debt workout mechanism for 
addressing the problem. Both debtor and creditor countries urgently need to put in place an 
international framework to solve the debt problem.    
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Within the CEE and CIS region the review of policy responses has shown that, in 
many cases, countries are developing stimulus packages and targeting infrastructure, social 
safety nets, and cash transfers. However, the safety-net measures in particular tend to be short 
term and piecemeal, providing a temporary cushion to help households weather the current 
crisis, but leaving them just as vulnerable to the next one. Moreover, for the most part they 
are not consistent with tax policy, which continues to rely primarily on consumption taxes 
that disproportionately hurt the poor. Examination reveals that anticrisis measures in most 
countries are largely blind to the gender-specific impacts of the crisis and the gender-specific 
responses needed to promote recovery that can provide the basis for more equitable and 
sustainable development. 
Therefore, once resources have been secured, economic policymakers need to focus 
on three things. First of all, they need to ensure greater coherence in fiscal policy, making 
sure revenue gathering and tax policies are in line with expenditures. Expenditures should be 
aligned with the broad policy objectives of putting in place a social protection floor, investing 
in socially beneficial infrastructure, and creating decent work opportunities. This means that 
the tax burden cannot continue to fall on the poor, but must target high-income groups and 
corporations. Policies such as tax holidays and tax concessions to firms, which have been 
shown to have little influence on corporate decisions to locate, should be phased out.  
Second, policymakers need to align short-term responses with long-term directions. 
Currently there is a risk that the design of anticrisis measures is responding to a cyclical 
problem rather than a structural one. Addressing the structural economic problems involves 
not only rebalancing the financial and productive sectors of the economy, but also greater 
attention to macroeconomic stabilizers, including support to job security and universal social 
protection.  
Moreover, as the UN World Survey on the Role of Women in Development points 
out, economic policymakers need to recognize and fully address the links between economic 
and social policies, the formal and informal economy, and paid and unpaid work.  
Throughout the world, but especially in the CIS and CEE, for the last 20 years, 
economic policy choice has been presented as predetermined—balancing and managing 
different constituencies is left to the art of politics. Such an approach inevitably bows to the 
more powerful, both within and outside national borders. The weight and severity of the crisis 
requires a rethinking of policy responses, some of which have contributed to the crisis itself. 
It provides the opportunity for a change in direction for an alignment of policy choices that 




2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
United States 0.4 ‐2.7 n/a n/a ‐706.1 ‐369.8 ‐2.2 2.6
Euro Area 0.7 ‐4.2 n/a n/a ‐92.7 ‐82.1
Japan ‐0.7 ‐5.4 n/a n/a 157.1 96.9
Other Advanced 
Economies 1.2 ‐2.7 n/a n/a 108.5 93.3
Africa 5.2 1.7 28.5 21 32.4 ‐37.1 11.3 ‐17.1
Central and Eastern 
Europe 3.0 ‐5.0 154.7 6.4 ‐155.2 ‐48.4 ‐2.1 3.8
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 5.5 ‐6.7 ‐97.4 ‐98.5 108.1 48 18.2 ‐20.5
Developing Asia 7.6 6.2 35.7 ‐54.3 423.9 381.5 ‐22 . 3
Middle East 5.4 2.0 ‐58.9 48 345.3 42.8 14.4 ‐18.9













































Azerbaijan                    85.9               33,050              3,581  15.4 11.6 8.5 1.6 39.0
Tajikistan                    84.7                 3,712                 552  11.8 7.9 10  10  ..  
Armenia                    80.5                 9,204              2,996  5.2 6.8 36.4 14.3 46.0
Turkmenistan                    79.4                12,926               2,604  8.9 10.5 7   7  ..  
Kyrgyz 
Republic                    72.5                  3,745                  715  20.1 7.6 5.0 5.6 36.0
Moldova                    64.7                 4,402              1,200  7.3 7.2 7.3 23.6 33.0
Georgia                    61.9               10,175              2,313  5.5 2.1 13.0 13.0 53.0
Average                    75.7                11,031               1,994  10.6 7.7 14.0 11.6 41.4
Turkey                    58.0             655,881               8,984  10.1 0.9 10
b ..   26.0
Kazakhstan                    56.7            104,853              6,772  9.5 3.2 8  9.3 ..  
Romania                    54.8            165,976              7,703  6.3 7.1 6.0 6.0 30.0
Albania                    48.0               10,831              3,458  2.2 6.8 ..   17.5
Russian 
Federation                    45.3          1,290,082               9,079  13.3 5.6 21.0 21.0 9.0
Ukraine                    44.7            142,719              3,069  22.3 2.1 7.2 ..   17.0
Montenegro  42a                 3,846              6,194  9.0 7.5 10.0 10.3 ..  
Serbia  42a               40,122              5,435  8.6 5.4 13.0 12.7 21.0
Bulgaria                    39.9               39,549              5,163  7.2 6.0 9  7.3 8.0
Average                    49.6          272,651.2           6,206.3  9.8 5.0 11.4 12.0 18.5
Lithuania                    36.0               38,894           11,522  8.5 ‐4.6 36.0 37  10.0
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina                    35.0                15,144               4,008  3.8 5.5 31  35  ..  
Estonia                    33.2               20,959           15,621  7.0 ‐3.6 6  3.9 5.0
Latvia                    26.3               28,766           12,638  10.4 ‐4.6 4.0 4.3 10.0
Macedonia, 
FYR                    22.0                  7,927               3,891  4.1 4.9 4.0 4.0 18.0
Poland                    20.6            424,790           11,143  3.3 4.9 5.0 5.4 15.0
Uzbekistan                    16.9            223,111                 830  14.4 9.0 ..   ..   ..  
Hungary                    15.9            138,757           13,799  3.5 0.6 ..   8.7 5.0
Belarus                    15.6               45,276              4,667  13.3 10.0 1.5 2.4 ..  
Average                    24.6          104,847.0           8,679.9  7.6 2.5 10.1 4.8 10.5
Slovak 
Republic                    11.4                74,972            13,891  4.4 6.4 6.0 6.0 4.0
Croatia                    10.0               58,558           13,201  2.8 2.4 11  11.0 13.0
Czech Republic                      1.0             173,958            16,833  3.6 2.7 7  6.7 4.0
Slovenia                         ‐                47,182           23,379  2.1 3.5 ..   8.5 10.0

















































































Azerbaijan 85.9 7.5 4.5 19.6
Tajikistan 84.7 2.0 11.8 ‐13.7
Armenia 80.5 ‐15.6 4.5 ‐13.7
Turkmenistan 79.4 4.0 4.1 17.8
Kyrgyz 
Republic 72.5 1.5 5.0 ‐7.8
Moldova 64.7 ‐9.0 5.0 ‐11.8
Georgia 61.9 ‐4.0 3.0 ‐16.3
Average 75.7 ‐1.9 5.4 ‐3.7
Turkey 58.0 ‐6.5 5.8 ‐1.9
Kazakhstan 56.7 ‐2.0 7.1 ‐2.0
Romania 54.8 ‐8.5 4.3 ‐5.5
Albania 48.0 0.7 1.8 ‐11.5
Russian 
Federation 45.3 ‐7.5 11.0 3.6
Ukraine 44.7 ‐14.0 14.0 0.4
Montenegro 42.0 ‐4.0 ‐1.0 ‐16.0
Serbia 42.0 ‐4.0 10.0 ‐9.1
Bulgaria 39.9 ‐6.5 1.5 ‐11.4
Average 47.9 ‐5.8 6.1 ‐5.9
Lithuania 36.0 ‐18.5 ‐0.3 1.0
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 35.0 ‐3.0 0.8 ‐9.1
Estonia 33.2 ‐14.0 ‐1.5 1.9
Latvia 26.3 ‐18.0 ‐1.7 4.5
Macedonia, 
FYR 22.0 ‐2.5 ‐1.0 ‐10.6
Poland 20.6 1.0 3.0 ‐2.2
Uzbekistan 16.9 7.0 10.2 7.2
Hungary 15.9 ‐6.7 6.1 ‐2.9
Belarus 15.6 ‐1.2 11.0 ‐9.6
Average 24.6 ‐6.2 3.0 ‐2.2
Slovak 
Republic 11.4 ‐4.7 1.5 ‐8.0
Croatia 10.0 ‐5.2 3.0 ‐6.1
Czech Republic 1.0 ‐4.3 0.5 ‐2.1
Slovenia 0.0 ‐4.7 1.0 ‐3.0






















































































Azerbaijan         1.54             7.7                      (14.0)                35.5                 12.0                    4.4                  34.0                1.0 
Tajikistan         0.46                        10.0                  (7.9)                34.0                 45.5                     6.0                2.0 
Armenia         0.63             5.5                          8.0                (11.5)                30.0                    9.0                  16.0                2.0 
Turkmenistan                          6.0                  18.7                     6.0                  13.0                2.0 
Kyrgyz 
Republic            3.4                           6.0                  (8.2)                 65.0                  19.0                     3.0                5.0 
Moldova         0.59             3.3                        11.0                (17.7)                66.0                 38.3                  34.0                7.0 
Georgia         0.58             7.5                        17.0                (22.7)                22.0                    6.8                  11.0                2.0 
Average         0.76             5.5                           6.3                  (2.0)                 33.6                  20.5                  16.7                3.0 
Turkey         0.79             8.9                          3.0                  (5.7)                39.0                    0.2                  17.0                8.0 
Kazakhstan         0.90             6.6                        10.0                    5.1               104.0                    0.2                  12.0              30.0 
Romania         0.64             4.5                          6.0                (12.4)                52.0                    5.6                  36.0                7.0 
Albania         0.57             5.1                          4.0                (14.1)                25.0                 10.1                  30.0                1.0 
Russian 
Federation         1.22             2.8                           4.0                     6.1                  29.0                     0.3                  21.0                3.0 
Ukraine         0.88             4.5                          7.0                  (7.2)                53.0                    3.9                  31.0                8.0 
Montenegro            5.3                        23.0                (29.6)                34.0                       ‐                 2.0 
Serbia         0.55             2.9                          8.0                (17.3)                68.0                  10.0                8.0 
Bulgaria         0.72             2.4                        23.0                (25.5)                84.0                    5.7                  43.0              11.0 
Average         0.79             4.8                           9.8                (11.2)                 54.2                     3.7                  22.2                8.7 
Lithuania         0.76             5.1                          5.0                (11.6) ..                      3.8   ..    ..   
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina         0.61             3.3                         14.0                (14.7)                 41.0                  26.0                4.0 
Estonia         0.81             6.4                        13.0                  (9.3) ..                      2.3   ..    ..   
Latvia         0.66             5.2                          8.0                (12.6)              150.0                    2.1                  42.0              35.0 
Macedonia, 
FYR         0.73             3.8                           4.0                (13.1)                 49.0                     3.6                  32.0                9.0 
Poland         0.87             6.7                          5.0                  (5.5)                48.0                    2.6                  31.0              12.0 
Uzbekistan                         1.0                 12.8                 17.0                     5.0                4.0 
Hungary         0.94             5.8                        27.0                  (8.4) ..                      0.3   ..    ..   
Belarus         0.90           11.5                          4.0                  (8.4)                21.0                    0.8                  63.0                2.0 
Average         0.78             6.0                           9.0                  (7.9)                 54.3                     2.2                  33.2              11.0 
Slovak 
Republic         0.95             4.2                           4.0                  (6.5)  ..     ..    ..   
Croatia         0.82             4.3                          8.0                  (9.4)                98.0                    2.9                  10.0              16.0 
Czech Republic         0.97             5.0                           5.0                  (3.1)  ..                       0.8   ..    ..   
Slovenia         0.95           48.2                          3.0                  (5.5) ..                      0.7   ..    ..   




























































































Azerbaijan                 1.00                      3                           82  74 57 0.44 36.5
Tajikistan                 3.00                      3  170 59 57 0.65 43.2
Armenia                 2.00                      3  39 26 58.9 0.57 33.8
Turkmenistan                 4.00   ..    130 57 0.65 28.1
Kyrgyz 
Republic                 4.00                      5  1 5 0 5 85 8 . 20 . 5 53 5 . 7
Moldova                 6.00                      8  22 14 56 0.73 ..  
Georgia                 2.00                      3  66 41 57 0.38 40.4
Average                 3.14                      4                       94.14                  45.33                57.30                  0.57                36.28 
Turkey                 3.00                      4  44 26 52 0.26 40.8
Kazakhstan                 3.00                      3  140 63 54 0.68 30.3
Romania                 3.00                      2  24 16 52.1 0.68 39.9
Albania                 2.00                      3  92 16 53.1 0.54 33
Russian 
Federation                 6.00   3   28 14 57.8 0.64 ..  
Ukraine                 2.00                      5  18 13 57.2 0.59 36.8
Montenegro                 4.00  ..    ..   60.9 0.58 34.9
Serbia                 5.00                      4  ..   56.1 0.59 25.8
Bulgaria                 4.00                      4  11 12 57.9 0.68 29.2
Average                 3.56                      4                       51.00                  22.86                55.68                  0.58                33.84 
Lithuania                 6.00                      5  11 7 56.6 0.7 39
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina                 5.00   ..    3 1 34 9 . 80 . 6 13 5 . 8
Estonia                 4.00                      5  25 6 59.6 0.65 36
Latvia                 4.00                      5  10 9 59 0.67 35.8
Macedonia, 
FYR                 4.00                      4  10 15 58.3 0.49 35.6
Poland                 3.00                      5  8 6 59 0.59 31.5
Uzbekistan  ..    ..    24 57 57 0.64 ..  
Hungary                 2.00                      5  6 7 56.1 0.75 33.9
Belarus                 5.00                      5  18 10 54.2 0.63 29.7
Average                 4.13                      5                       12.78                  14.44                56.62                  0.64                34.66 
Slovak 
Republic                 6.00                      4  6 7 56 0.58 31.2
Croatia                 7.00                      5  7 6 53 0.67 29
Czech Republic                 6.00                      5  4 3 53.8 0.57 25.8
Slovenia                 1.00                      6  6 3 46.8 0.61 32.6




























































TABLE 6: EXTREME POVERTY GROUP: WHO ARE THE POOR? 
          












Azerbaijan  70% R, 69%U  58%M  57% (17-65)  47% SG  46% WE 
Tajikistan  97% R, 93%U  82% M  76% (<16)  58% SG 
34% Ret, 31% 
WE 
Kyrgyzstan  93% R, 98%U  79% M  55%(17-65)  56% SG 
37% SE, 24% 
WE 
Moldova  87% R, 81%U  63%M  60% (17-65)  40% SG 
33% WE, 31% 
Ret 
Georgia  89%R, 81%U  69%M  62% (17-65)  45% SG  38% SE 
Turkmenistan n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Armenia  96%R, 90%R  73%M  63% (17-65)  49% SG 
20% Ret, WE, 
Inactive WA 
Note: SG: Secondary General Education; WE: Wage Employment: Ret: Retired, SE: Self Employed; WA: 
Working Age 
With the exception of the first column, poverty rate calculations are based on USD 2.15/day. First column: 
$4.30/ day 







TABLE 7: HIGH POVERTY GROUP: WHO ARE THE POOR? 
 







profile of poor  
Education   Labor market 
position 
Kazakhstan  55%U, 67%R  63%M  59% (17-65)  45%SG  27% SE, 25% 
WE 
Romania  45%U, 72%R  76%M  59% (17-65)  39% PB  29% SE, 25% 
WE 
Albania  66% U, 75%R  91%M  52% (17-65)  77% PB  41% SE 
Russian Fed.  37%U, 53%R  68% F  63% (17-65)  46% SG, 38% 
SS 
53% WE 




35%U, 51%R  64% M  55% (17-65)  41% NE  31% Ret 
Bulgaria  31%U, 36%R  72%M  63% (17-65)  39% PB  41% UE 
Turkey  52% U, 67%R  88%M  49% (17-65)  60% PB  39% Ret, 37% 
SE 
Note: PB: Primary Basic, NE: No Education/ Illiterate, SG: Secondary General Education category,  
We: Wage Employment, Ret: Retired, SE: Self Employed, Inactive WA: Inactive Working Age 





TABLE 8: MEDIUM POVERTY GROUP: WHO ARE THE POOR?  
 
Country Urban/rural 





profile of poor 
Education   Labor market 
position 
Lithuania   15%U, 42%R  51%M 
 
56% (17-65)  49%PB  19% SE,19% 
Ret. 
Bosnia  38%U,33%R  77%M  60% (17-65)  46%SG  47% Inact. WA 
Estonia  24% U, 28%R  56% F  63% (17-65)  43% SS  35% WE 
Latvia  12%U,27%R  65% F  61% (17-65)  55% PB  31% UE, 21% 
WE 
Macedonia  24%U, 25%R  87%M  60% (17-65)  63% PB  47% Inact. WA 
Poland  22%U, 22%R  58%M  55% (17-65)  49% PB, 46% 
SS 
29% UE 
Uzbekistan  73%U, 93%R  83%M  55% (17-65)  59%SG  N/A 
Hungary  10% U, 16%R  95%M  66% (<16)  35% NE, 28% 
SS 
27% SE 
Belarus  23%U,18%R  59% F  57% (17-65)  35%SS  44% WE 
Note: PB: Primary Basic, NE: No Education/ Illiterate, SG: Secondary General Education category, We: Wage 
Employment, Ret: Retired, SE: Self Employed, Inactive WA: Inactive Working Age 
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